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INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW PERSPECTIVES
HARMONIZATION OF ANTI-DOPING CODE
THROUGH ARBITRATION: THE CASE LAW
OF THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR
SPORT*
FRANK OSCHOTZ**
INTRODUCTION
Doping affects the nature of sporting competition. It artificially amends
the physical conditions of athletes who claim to evaluate their natural
differences of performance against each other. Doping is an issue, which is
able to change fair competition into a spectacle for the mere amusement of the
spectator. The sporting world has decided to combat this development and to
impose severe sanctions against athletes found with forbidden substances in
their urine or blood. Where those sanctions are not accepted because the
results were obtained in an undue manner or the athlete considers himself
innocent, the parties will exchange legal arguments. This is where dispute
settlement systems come into play. Alongside the well-known state courts
exists another system of settlement: arbitration.
With the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), the sporting world has a
unique institution that provides support for the settlement of disputes relating
to sport. Over the past seventeen years, and in more than three hundred cases,
the CAS has developed a certain expertise in this field. It is the aim of this
study to examine the jurisprudence of the CAS in doping cases in order to see
whether there are certain principles the arbitrators follow.
After a short introduction to the history of the CAS and its Appeals
arbitration procedure (Chapter I), this essay will examine, in particular, the
structure of the doping offense in the light of its jurisprudence (Chapter II).
The jurisprudence of the CAS in doping cases is already the subject of certain
* The author would like to thank Matthieu Reeb, Acting Secretary General of the CAS for his help.
** University of Nuremberg; L.L.M., Universities of Geneva and Lausanne, Switzerland. The author
is attorney-at-law with KPMG Beiten Burkhardt, Munich, Germany.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
articles.' However, while those articles are mainly based on the Digest of CAS
Awards,2 this study also includes decisions that were rendered after that
edition of the Digest was prepared. Many of them are still unpublished.
3
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CAS DECISIONS
A. Origin and History of the CAS
The CAS was founded in 1983 following an initiative of the former
International Olympic Committee (IOC) President, Juan Antonio Samaranch.
The idea was to create a court with a jurisdiction specifically adapted to the
needs of sport. 4 The CAS is a permanent arbitration institution having its seat
in Lausanne, Switzerland. The arbitration cases are decided by a panel of one
or three arbitrators following the Code for the CAS. 5 The arbitrators are
chosen from a closed list, which today contains 186 persons. 6 The Code
provides for special procedures for ordinary arbitration and appellate
arbitration proceedings. The latter is specifically designed to serve the needs
of an appeal against a decision of a federation or a club. This is the procedure
which is applied in doping cases.
In 1994 the CAS was restructured and placed under the auspices of the
International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS), an independent
foundation under Swiss law. The ICAS, inter alia, assures the financing of the
CAS, maintains the list of arbitrators, and may amend the arbitration rules.
The ICAS also decides challenges of arbitrators. 7 Its members are not allowed
to serve as arbitrators or counsel in CAS arbitration. 8 Furthermore, in a
decision in 1995, the ICAS created a special chamber responsible for the
settlement of disputes arising during the Olympic Games.9 This chamber was
1. Michael J. Beloff, Drugs, Lmvs and Versapaks, in DRUGS AND DOPING IN SPORT: Soclo-
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 39 (John O'Leary ed., 2001); Stephan Netzle, Wie halt es das Internationale
Sportschiedsgericht mit dem Doping?, in DOPING: REALITAT UND RECHT 197 (Klaus Vieweg ed.,
1998).
2. DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 1998) [hereinafter CAS DIGEST].
3. Since the writing of this article some of these decisions have been reported in DIGEST OF CAS
AWARDS II 1998-2000 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002) [hereinafter CAS DIGEST II].
4. For the history of the CAS, see CAS DIGEST, supra note 2, at xxiii.
5. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, CODE [hereinafter CODE], available at http://www.tas-
cas.org.
6. Id. atart. S13.
7. Id. at art. R34.
8. Id. at art. S5.
9. Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler, Arbitration and the Games Or the First Experience of the Olympic
Division of the Court ofArbitration for Sport, 12 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., at AI (Feb. 1997).
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not only active during the Olympic Games in Atlanta, 10 Nagano1' and
Sydney, 12 but continued its work during the Olympic Games in Salt Lake City,
as well. These chambers also dealt with a line of doping cases.
The independence of the CAS has been questioned before the Federal
Tribunal of Switzerland. It has been upheld under the rules in force before
1994 and also under the rules in force after that date, at least for cases where
the IOC is not a direct party.13 The CAS is thus fully recognized as an
arbitration court, with its jurisdiction excluding the jurisdiction of state courts.
B. Appellate Jurisdiction of the CAS
1. Arbitration agreement
The arbitration agreement forms the basis of each arbitration procedure.
Here the parties agree to exclude state court jurisdiction in favor of the
jurisdiction of an arbitration Panel. For the appellate arbitration proceedings,
Article R47 of the Code provides that the arbitration agreement may be
contained in the statutes or regulations of sports bodies. 14 Meanwhile, almost
all 15 members of the Olympic movement included such a clause in their
statutes. These provisions provide that an appeal against each decision
(including doping) of the federation is subject to appeal before the CAS.
An interesting arbitration clause is contained in the International Cycling
Union (UCI) 16 regulations. On the one hand, Article 113 of the UCI's
Antidoping Examination Regulations (AER) provides that the UCI may refer a
case to the CAS if a national federation fails to sanction a doping offense. 17
On the other hand, Article 112 gives the UCI the possibility of bringing an
10. Gabrielle Kaufinann-Kohler, Atlanta et l'Arbitrage ou les Premieres Experiences de la
Division Olympique de TribunalArbitral du Sport, ASS'N SUISSE D'ARBITRAGE BULL. 433 (1996).
11. Gabrielle Kaufinann-Kohler, Nagano et l'Arbitrage-ou Vers Une Justice de Proximite,
ASS'N SUISSE D'ARBITRAGE BULL. 311 (1998).
12. Dirk-Reiner Martens & Frank Oschutz, Die Entscheidungen des TAS in Sydney, 1 SPURT 4
(2001).
13. Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, BGE 119 11 271 (Switz. 1993); N. v. Federation Equestre
Internationale, in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2, at 585; Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, BGE
5PA27.2000 (Switz. Dec. 4, 2000), available at www.bger.ch.
14. CODE, supra note 5, at art. R47.
15. The Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) recently created its own
arbitration court. FIFA STAT. Ch.13, art. 63 (July 2001).
16. The International Cycling Union will be referred to throughout this article as "UCI," which is
the union's common acronym based on its French name.
17. INTERNATIONAL CYCLING UNION, PART XlV ANTIDOPING EXAMINATION REGULATIONS,
art. 113 (July 2001), available at http://www.uci.ch/english/abouttrules/chl4_dopage.pdf.
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appeal against the decision of a national federation to the CAS. 18 In one case
the CAS observed that these powers would place the UCI in a position of a
"prosecutor" against the national federations. 19 The arbitrators wondered
whether they could accept such an "appeal" under the existing rules. They
decided to accept the case although they considered it more suitable that the
UCI would make its own decision first, which could then be appealed to the
CAS.20
Arbitration clauses may also be contained in individual agreements, which
have been entered into before or after a dispute has arisen.21 Examples of the
former are participation forms for certain competitions22 or license agreements
between an athlete and a federation. An arbitration clause is also contained in
the application form for the Olympic Games.23
2. Time limits and exhaustion of internal remedies
An appeal will only be admitted if the applicant has exhausted all internal
remedies prior to the appeal.24 This runs parallel with proceedings before state
courts and follows the idea that the federation has reached a final decision only
after all internal remedies against the decision of one of its organs have been
exhausted. Usually the statutes of the federations provide a certain time limit
to file the appeal before the CAS. If no such time limit is provided, the Code
will fix a time limit of twenty-one days from the day of communication of the
decision which is appealed.25
3. Procedure and award
According to Article R28 of the Code, the seat of each Arbitration Panel is
in Lausanne.2 6 Thus, the law governing the arbitration procedure (the so-
18. Id. atart. 112.
19. Int'l Cycling Union v. Jogert, No. 97/176, slip op. at 4 (Ct. Arb. Sport Aug. 28, 1998).
20. Id.
21. Int'l Basketball Fed'n v. W., No. 94/123 (CAS 1994), in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2, at 317,
318; Nat'l Wheelchair Basketball Ass'n v. International Paralympic Comm., No. 95/122 (CAS 1996),
in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2, at 173, 175 [hereinafter Nat I Wheelchair].
22. USA Shooting v. International Shooting Union, No. 94/129 (CAS 1993), in CAS DIGEST,
supra note 2, at 187, 190.
23. INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC CHARTER, ch. 5, § 5.1 at *36, available at
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en-report_122.pdf.
24. CODE, supra note 5, at art. R47.
25. Id. at art. R49.
26. Id. at art. R28.
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called lex arbitri) is Swiss Law.27 The procedure before the Panels is divided
into two steps. A written procedure with an exchange of documents 28 is, in
almost all cases, followed by a hearing29 where the Panel will examine
witnesses and discuss the evidence with the parties. The Panel may also
request the production of certain pieces of evidence. 30
The applicable substantive law will be the law chosen by the parties or the
law of the country where the federation, which issued the challenged decision,
has its seat.31 This provision ensures a stable legal framework for the decision
of the federation and is predictable for all parties. In reaching a decision the
Panels have full power to review the facts and the law. Thus, and unlike many
state courts,32 the Panels will not be restricted to a summary review of the
decision. The CAS clarified its powers in one decision holding that the Panels
may consider "all evidence, oral and written, produced before it. ... In short,
the hearing before the Panel constituted a hearing de novo, that is a rehearing
of the merits of the case." 33 As a general rule, the CAS will apply the rules
applicable at the time the offense was committed. However, the lex mitior
principle obliges the Panel to apply the law as it stands at the time of the
determination where it is more favourable to the appellant. This is a principle
of criminal law that is common in a democratic society.34 It is established, for
example, in Article two, Paragraph two of the Swiss Penal Code and was also
applied in CAS arbitration cases.35 Referring to the "constant jurisprudence"
of the CAS the lex mitior principle was also used to order a suspension on
27. LoI FEDERALE SUR LE Dlorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVE, ch. 12, art. 176; Champ
d'Application; Siege du Tribunal Arbitral, available at http://www.admin.ch/chbf/rs/291/a176.html.
This is also true for the ad hoe Panels at the Olympic Games. Kaufinann-Kohler, supra note 11, at
320.
28. CODE, supra note 5, at R51, R54.
29. Id. at arts. R57, R44.2.
30. Id. at arts. R57, R44.3.
31. Id. at art. R58. For the application of European Competition Law as mandatory law, see
AEK Athens v. Union des Associations Europeenes de Football, No. 98/200 (CAS 1999), in
YEARBOOK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION XXV 393,395-97 (2000).
32. For Swiss Law, see Anton Heini, Die Gerichtliche Oberprfifung von Vereinsstrafen, in
FREIHEIT UND VERANTWORTUNG IM RECHT 223 (Peter Forstmoser & Walter R. Schluep eds., 1982);
For German Law, see [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 128, 93 (F.R.G.).
33. B. v. Federation Internationale de Natation, No. 98/211 (CAS 1999), in CAS DIGEST II,
supra note 3, at 255, 257; Federacion Cubana de Levamiento de Pesas v. International Weightlifting
Fed'n, No. 99/A/252, slip op. at 17 (Ct. Arb. Sport July 28, 2000).
34. Union Cycliste Internationale v. Comite National Olympique Italion, Advisory Opinion No.
94/128 (CAS 1995), in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2, at 495, 509.
35. A.C. v. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 96/149 (CAS 1997), in CAS
DIGEST, supra note 2, at 251, 260; Meca-Medina v. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur,
No. 99/A/234 & 99/A/235, slip op. at 13 (Ct. Arb. Sport Feb. 29, 2000).
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probation.36
The Panels are generally not bound to follow earlier decisions or even to
obey the rules of stare decisis. However, the Panels have also declared that
they are disposed to follow earlier CAS decisions for reasons of comity and in
order to strengthen legal predictability in international sports law. 37
The award shall be rendered within a time limit of four months starting
from the filing of the statement of appeal.38 This time limit may be extended
by the President of the Appeals Division upon a motivated request from the
President of the Panel. Experience has shown that the Panels normally will try
their best to render their decision within the time limits or will not exceed
them by very much.
The CAS may also order provisional measures. 39 Before the Panel is
constituted, the power to issue such orders lies with the President of the
Division. Once the Panel is constituted then this power shifts to the Panel.
According to the Code, this power will also exclude the competence of any
state court to order such measures while an appeal is pending before the
CAS.40
II. THE AWARDS CONCERNING DOPING CASES
A. Basic Ideas
1. Interests
The CAS addressed the doping issue for the first time two years after its
creation. The second case brought before the CAS, a (non-binding) advisory
opinion, dealt with the admissibility of a life ban.41 Here, the arbitrators
confirmed that every decision by a federation had to respect the principles of
national and international law, and in particular the right to personality of the
accused athlete, among other human rights.42 Thus, the Panel ruled that an
36. Union Cycliste Internationale v. C., No. 2000/A/289 (CAS 2001), in CAS DIGEST II, supra
note 3, at 424, 430-31.
37. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 96/149, supra note 35, at 258-59;
Jogert, No. 97/176, slip op. at 14.
38. CODE, supra note 5, at art. R59.
39. Id. at R37.
40. Id.
41. Int'l Olympic Comm., Advisory Opinion No. 86/02 (CAS 1986), in CAS COMPILATION 61
(1993).
42. Id.
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athlete could be banned for life only if he committed a deliberate offense or
manifestly contravened the spirit of fair play in another way. Furthermore, the
substance found had to be on the doping list and the procedure must have been
strictly respected.43 The arbitrators considered themselves as having the task
of insuring that the law, the basic principle of innocence, and that the correct
application of the rules of the federation were respected."
On the other hand, in various decisions, the CAS also emphasized the need
for effective measures in the fight against doping. The arbitrators underlined
that the high objectives and practical necessities of the fight against doping
may justify the application of strict definitions and rules without exemptions.
These objectives notably justified the strict liability rule so that the federation
does not have to prove the guilty intent of the athlete. For these reasons (and
until lately45) most of the Panels were not convinced that this standard was
unreasonable or contrary to natural justice or constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade.46
It is between those two poles of reasoning-the protection of the rights of
the accused athlete and the need for effective measures against doping to
preserve the credibility of sport-that the jurisprudence of the CAS in doping
cases needs to be considered. However, in one case, the CAS acknowledged
that repressive measures is only one method in the fight against doping.47
Federations should also assist athletes who are sometimes not only offenders
but also victims. Federations may, for example, reward confessions with a
considerable reduction of the sanction for a doping offense.48
2. Interpretation
From the outset the CAS made clear that the fight against doping may be
conducted only within certain limits that are imposed by law. The CAS
stressed that a federation may punish an athlete only on the basis of its rules in
force at the time the offense had been committed. They may not invoke a
practice that has no legal basis. The arbitrators emphasized that the rules have
to emanate from duly authorized bodies and need to be adopted in
43. Id.
44. N. v. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 91/156 (CAS 1992), in CAS COMPILATION 19
(1993).
45. Aanes v. Federation Internationale de Luttes Associees, No. 2001/A/317, slip op. at 15 (Ct.
Arb. Sport July 9, 2001).
46. USA Shooting, supra note 22, at 194; Foschi v. Federation Internationale de Natation
Amateure, No. 961156, slip op. at 42 (Ct. Arb. Sport Oct. 6, 1997).
47. Union Cycliste Internationale, No. 2000/A/289, supra note 36, at 428.
48. Id. at429.
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constitutionally proper ways. 49  However, despite some general
considerations, as yet the Panels have not controlled the validity of regulations
of the federations under the state law applicable to the case.50
The CAS has also underlined that the arbitrators were not empowered to
create a doping offense through its decisions. 51 Unable to find a legal basis for
such a decision in the rules of the Federation, the CAS annulled a decision,
which preliminarily suspended an athlete.52 In another case brought before the
ad hoc chamber at the Olympic Games in Nagano, a snowboarder tested
positive for marijuana metabolites.53 The Panel observed that marijuana was a
prohibited substance under the Antidoping Code only if there was an
agreement between the international federation and the IOC to that extent.54
Since the evidence showed that such an agreement was missing, no doping
offense could be established. 55
This approach shows that the work of the arbitrators is clearly limited to
an interpretation of the statutes in force. Any interpretation of such rules will
always find its limit in their wording. 56 The conditions of doping offenses
cannot be created by dispute settlement bodies. This task has to be left to the
members of the respective federation. However, in one case the CAS Panel
showed a quite different approach.57 There was no definition of a doping
offense in the rules of the federation. Nevertheless, the Panel found it
sufficient that the introductory notes to the Medical Control Guide, which
were prepared by the Chairman of the Medical board, mentioned that "the
presence of the drug in the urine constitutes an offense, irrespective of the
route of administration." 58 For the arbitrators this was a sufficiently clear
regulation allowing the imposition of a suspension against the athlete. Bearing
in mind the strict standards established in earlier cases, this decision is unique
and rather surprising.
In addition to the pure existence of a legal basis, the CAS emphasized the
49. USA Shooting, supra note 22, at 197.
50. See, e.g., L. v. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/142 (CAS 1996), in
CAS DIGEST, supra note 2, at 225, 238; USA Shooting, supra note 22, at 194.
51. USA Shooting, supra note 22, at 194.
52. M. v. Federation Italianne de Cyclisme, No. 97/169 (CAS 1997), in CAS DIGEST, supra note
2, at 539, 541.
53. Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Nagano 1998), 002, R. v. International Olympic
Comm., award of 12 February, 1998, in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2, at 419.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 423.
56. USA Shooting, supra note 22, at 194.
57. Nat'l Wheelchair, supra note 21, at 178.
58. Id. (quoting Dr. Ridiwg, ICC Medical Chairman).
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need for clarity of the rules in force. Athletes and officials should not be
confronted with a thicket of mutually-qualifying or even contradictory rules
that can be understood only on the basis of the de facto practice over the
course of many years of a small group of insiders.59 This includes the duty of
both the international and the national federation to keep those within their
jurisdiction aware of the "precepts of the relevant code." 60 In one case the
Panel ruled that due to the lack of clarity it would interpret the rules contra
stipulatorem.61 On the other hand, the arbitrators are likewise prepared to
interpret the rules in a way "which seeks to discern the intention of the rule
maker, and not to frustrate it."62
When considering whether the rules are sufficiently clear and
unambiguous, the test to be applied is not whether a legally trained person
would consider the rules as thus. Instead the arbitrators ask themselves
whether an athlete who is subject to the rules and has no legal education or
experience understands the rules clearly and unambiguously. 63 Consequently,
the Panels have not hesitated to criticize poor drafting and a lack of clarity in
the rules. 64
The Panel will always examine the correct application of the rules in
force. It will pay special attention to any additional requirements added to a
pure strict liability regime. In one case, the doping definition required that the
forbidden substance was taken "with the aim of attaining an increase in
performance." 65 Here, the CAS annulled the sanction of an athlete because
the federation was unable to provide evidence to that extent.66 On the other
hand, the Panels have constantly refused to take into account that a forbidden
substance might not have had any performance enhancing effect. As a
question of legal security, the arbitrators refused to examine this question
where the Code of the federation did not expressly require a performance
enhancing effect.67 In another case, where the rules required a performance
59. USA Shooting, supra note 22, at 197.
60. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 96/149, supra note 35, at 262.
61. Aanes, No. 2001/A/317, slip op. at 15.
62. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 96/149, supra note 35, at 259.
63. Foschi, No. 961156, slip op. at 52.
64. USA Shooting, supra note 22, at 196; Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No.
96/149, supra note 35, at 262; Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 52; Leipold v. Federation Intemationale
des Luttes Associees, No. 2000/A/312, slip op. at 11 (Ct. Arb. Sport Oct. 22, 2001).
65. USA Shooting, supra note 22, at 194 (quoting Article 2 of the International Shooting Union
(UILT) Anti-Doping Regulations).
66. Id.
67. F. v. Federation Equestre Internationale, No. 95/147 (CAS 1996), in CAS DIGEST, supra note
2, at 245, 249.
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enhancing effect, the athlete failed to provide conclusive evidence that the
substance (Ephedrine) did not have any performance enhancing effect (for a
motorbike rider).68
3. Hierarchy of norms
The CAS has recognized that a national federation may be bound by the
"regulations of an International Federation" as well as by "legislation of its
[home] country. 69 In the case of contradictions, the national federation would
at least be obliged to interpret and apply the statutory provisions in light of the
principles of the Council of Europe Convention against doping (which is
binding on the Member-State that has enacted anti-doping legislation). 70 In
the case of a conflict between state legislation and the rules laid down by sport
governing bodies (including the IOC), it is incumbent on the public authorities
to refrain from taking "coercive measures [which hinder the] application of the
rules in international sport.",7'
In a later opinion the CAS again underlined the plurality between national
authorities and international sport governing bodies in the fight against
doping.72 The arbitrator confirmed the principles established earlier: The
competencies in the fight against doping are shared between state authorities
and sport organizations as evidenced in the Council of Europe's Anti-Doping
Convention, signed on November 16, 1989, and the declaration of Lausanne
(January 13, 1994), 73 where all major sports governing bodies agreed to
coordinate their efforts.74 He also emphasized again the need for uniform
doping rules. However, in another decision, the Panel ruled that a binding
decision on a national level, even if it was taken by a state authority, would not
hinder the international federation in adopting its own sanction. 75  The
arbitrators confirmed that this decision-making power was necessary in order
to ensure equal treatment of all athletes in cases of doping offenses and to stop
68. H. v. Federation Internationale de Motocyclisme, No. 2000/A/281 (CAS 2000), in CAS
DIGEST II, supra note 3, at 418.
69. Federation Francaise de Triathlon & International Triathlon Union, Advisory Opinion, No.
93/109 (CAS 1994), in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2, at 467, 473.
70. Id. at 475.
71. Union Cycliste Internationale, No. 94/128, supra note 34, at 508.
72. European Olympic Comms., Advisory Opinion No. 95/144 (CAS 1995), in CAS DIGEST,
supra note 2, at 523.
73. Georg Englebrecht, Adoption, Recognition and Harmonization of Doping Sanctions Between
World Sports Organisations, 4 INT'L SPORTS L.J. 3 (2000).
74. European Olympic Comms., No. 95/144, supra note 72, at 526.
75. Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 39; B. v. International Judo Fed'n, No. 98/214 (CAS 1999), in
CAS DIGEST II, supra note 3, at 308, 316.
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the fight against doping from being hampered by a race to the lowest standards
possible.76
B. The Doping Offense
Since the CAS is bound to apply the rules of the federations, 77 the
interpretation of the doping offense will depend on the formula used in the
respective statutory provisions. A harmonization on the basis of the Olympic
Movement Anti-Doping Code has not yet been achieved. Thus, there can be
no general CAS definition of the doping offense applied to all cases brought
before it. Yet there are clear tendencies to interpret the doping regulations in a
similar manner.
Before going into the details, one realizes, for example, that the arbitrators
have so far tried to avoid addressing the issue of fault. Two concepts are at
odds. On the one hand, there are Panels, which have stressed that the nature of
a doping offense is one of pure strict liability, i.e. a liability without fault.
Consequently, there is no need to address the issue of intent or negligence.
Nevertheless, many Panels have felt the need to soften the harsh consequences
of such a strict liability regime for athletes who acted neither intentionally nor
negligently. The athletes should have the opportunity to escape their liability.
Therefore, many Panels added a shift in the burden of proof to enable the
athlete to show that he committed the offense without fault. By doing so, the
intentional element that would normally not exist in a strict liability offense
snuck in the back door. On the other hand, there are Panels, which use the
legal presumption of guilt when a forbidden substance is found in the body of
an athlete. Here the athlete has per defintionem the possibility (in most cases
rather theoretical) to rebut the presumption of guilt by presenting evidence that
he did not act intentionally or negligently. Consequently, those Panels would
not apply the concept of strict liability. However, one may also perceive a
certain degree of misunderstanding of those two different legal concepts.78 As
shown, there is a definite need to clarify the material concepts of strict
liability, liability with a presumption of guilt, and the procedural concepts of
the burden of proof and its reversal, as well as the idea of prima facie
evidence. 79
76. International Judo Fed'n, supra note 75, at 316-17.
77. CODE, supra note 5, at art. R58.
78. W. v. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/86 (CAS 1993), in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2,
at 161, 163.
79. Aanes, No. 2001/A/317, slip op. at 15.
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1. The concept of strict liability
It was in one of the first doping cases examined by a CAS Panel where the
arbitrators first qualified the provision in the International Equestrian
Federation (FEI) laws providing for automatic disqualification from an event
as being a case of "pure strict liability. 80 Thus, the mere fact of a positive
doping result may justify the disqualification of the person responsible. 81
Also, the provisions of the IOC Anti-Doping Code were regarded as
containing a strict liability offense.82 The principle of strict liability was also
addressed and clarified in a later decision which had to apply the Federation
Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA) rules. The Panel in this case gave
a definition of the strict liability in doping cases:
[U]nder the term "strict liability," one should understand a concept of
liability similar to that of civil liability, without fault in tort, or
comparable to product liability cases .... It does not raise the issue of
guilt (or "the presumption of guilt") with respect to the applicability of
disciplinary sanctions. The concept of "strict liability," as it has been
used in doping cases, does not imply an intentional element....
There is no tie between sanction and intent.83
The Panel felt bound to apply the Rules as they stood and did not want to
call into question their validity.84 The CAS acknowledged that the application
of the strict liability regime might create a certain degree of hardship or be
perceived as unfair. In this respect the CAS has always emphasized the need
for equal opportunities in sporting competition. As long as only a
disqualification was at stake, the arbitrators have always felt prepared to apply
the strict liability regime without any alteration.85  The arbitrators have
underlined that the interests of the other competitors will prevail over the
interests of the single athlete found with a forbidden substance, since this is a
80. G. v. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 91/53 (CAS 1992), in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2,
79, 87.
8 1. G. v. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/63 (CAS 1992), in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2, at
115, 121; N. v. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/73 (CAS 1992), in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2,
at 153, 158; SJ. v. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/71 (CAS 1992), in CAS DIGEST, supra note
2, at 135, 140.
82. See, e.g., International Olympic Comm., supra note 53, at 424.
83. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/142, supra note 50, at 230-3 1.
84. C. v. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141 (CAS 1996), in CAS
DIGEST, supra note 2, at 215, 219; B v. International Triathlon Union, No. 98/222 (CAS 1999), in
CAS DIGEST II, supra note 3, at 330, 336.
85. Leipold, No. 2000/A/312, slip op. at 28.
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question of procedural fairness.86 The idea of balancing the interests of an
athlete found with a forbidden substance during a competition with the
interests of the other participants competing without a forbidden substance
was also addressed in later decisions.87
In another case the CAS added as an argument the need for effective
measures in the fight against doping.88 In this case a shooter tested positive
after he had taken a medicine containing a forbidden substance, although a
physician assured him that it did not. The Panel observed that a
disqualification may be a harsh consequence for the athlete but the non-
disqualification would be more unfair for the other athletes. 89 For these
reasons the arbitrators stated:
[T]he Panel would as a matter of principle be prepared to apply a strict
liability test. The Panel is aware that arguments have been raised that
a strict liability standard is unreasonable, and indeed contrary to
natural justice, because it does not permit the accused to establish
moral innocence. It has been argued that it is an excessive restraint of
trade. The Panel is unconvinced by such objections and considers that
in principle the high objectives and practical necessities of the fight
against doping amply justify the application of a strict liability
standard.90
In a line of awards the Panels also explained the necessity of a strict
liability regime in respect to the additional sanctions. In the eyes of the
arbitrators this strict rule was necessary notwithstanding a certain degree of
hardship.91 The Panels took note that a pure strict liability regime would not
leave room for the athlete to provide exculpatory evidence, and thus did not
distinguish between athletes who were doped deliberately, negligently, or
without their knowledge. 92 It would exempt the athlete only in very limited
circumstances:
[I]t renders the question of guilt irrelevant and allows for exoneration
only in very limited and usually exhaustively listed cases, such as
86. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/14 1, supra note 84, at 220.
87. Federation Equestre Internationale, supra note 67, at 249; Leipold, No. 2000/A/312, slip op.
at 28.
88. USA Shooting, supra note 22, at 187.
89. Id. at 193.
90. Id.
91. V. v. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141 (CAS 1996), in CAS
DIGEST, supra note 2, at 271; Union Cycliste Internationale v. Moiler, No. 99A/239, slip op. at 10
(Ct. Arb. Sport Apr. 14, 2000).
92. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141, supra note 84, at 220.
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"force majeure" or wrongful act of a third person.... [E]ven a
successful proof by the athlete that there was no guilt on his side (i.e.
no intention or negligence) would not exempt him from liability. This
is, on one hand, a faithful transposition of the civil (tort) law concept
of "strict liability" (as distinguished from a "presumed guilt"), and, on
the other hand, also the only interpretation capable to ensure efficient
fight against doping.93
In this respect the arbitrators held that the fight against doping would be
made "practically impossible" 94 if the federation had to prove the intentional
nature of the act.95 The level of intent would thus only play a role in the
question of the amount of the sanction. 96 Even the CAS considered that
"[w]hether a severe sanction such as a two year ban may be imposed on an
athlete without examining the issue of guilt and intent was not undisputed,
particularly in view of art. 28 of the Swiss Civil Code (Personality rights). 97
The arbitrators also remarked that a part of the doctrine required the
application of the principle nulla poena sine culpa in relation to additional
suspensions.98 Despite these shy criticisms, the Panel adhered to the strict
liability rule refusing to consider any element of fault.99 One Panel was not
convinced that the principle of strict liability would violate Swiss law, because
a CAS award applying these principles had been upheld by the Swiss Federal
Tribunal. 100 However, that Panel ignored the fact that the Swiss Federal
Tribunal did not address the issue as to whether the arbitrators correctly
applied Swiss law. They just had to consider whether the Arbitral award
violated the "international ordre public".
The critics of this concept in legal literature are numerous.101 The critics
basically argue that as far as an additional sanction is concerned, the principle
of sporting fairness is no longer a preponderant factor allowing liability
93. International Triathion Union, supra note 84, at 336-37 (emphasis added).
94. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141, supra note 84, at 220.
95. Leipold, No. 2000/A/312, slip op. at 28.
96. N. v. Federation Internationale de Natation, No. 98/208 (CAS 1998), in CAS DIGEST II,
supra note 3, at 234, 247-48; International Triathlon Union, supra note 84, at 337.
97. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/142, supra note 50, at 231.
98. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141, supra note 84, at 220.
99. Meca-Medina, Nos. 99/A/234 & 99/A/235, slip op. at 24.
100. Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, BGE 5P.83, slip op. at 7 (Switz. Mar. 31, 1999).
101. Aaron N. Wise, "Strict Liability" Drug Rules of Sports Governing Bodies: Are They
Legal?, DEFENSOR LEGIS 119 (1997); Margareta Baddeley, Dopingsperren als Verbandssanktion aus
Nationaler und Internationaler Sicht, in DOPING-SANKTIONEN, BEWEISE, ANSPROCHE 9, 21
(Jochen Fritzweiler ed., 2000).
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without fault.102 The additional sanction is designed to punish the athlete for a
violation of the respective rules by excluding him from competition. Since
competitions are more or less the only activity of an average professional
athlete, this exclusion should at least be accompanied by an appreciation of the
subjective elements of each case. This is all the more true since the
federations are monopolies in their fields of sport. These criticisms were
partly followed by very recent CAS decisions. Here, for the first time, the
arbitrators acknowledged that an additional sanction cannot be imposed
without addressing the issue of guilt at the stage of the doping definition and
not only at the amount of the sanction. 103
2. The rebuttable presumption of guilt
In conclusion of the foregoing, one has to realize that the principle of strict
liability cannot be justified if additional suspensions are at stake. That might
have also been the reason why many Panels, although claiming to follow a
strict liability rule, allowed the athlete to produce exculpatory evidence. To
allow such evidence does not fit at allin the legal scheme of strict liability. It
is more suitable for a doping definition, which involves the presumption of
guilt.
L The concept
Early CAS decisions already interpreted the FEI Regulations104 to contain
a system of legal presumptions with respect to the guilt of the accused athlete.
One Panel, in a very early decision on doping, noted that:
[W]here doping or the taking of prohibited substances is concerned,
there is normally and generally in the sporting regulations of
Federations an inversion of the burden of proof in the sense that, as
soon as the presence of a prohibited substance is detected, there is the
presumption of a voluntary act. It is then up to the athlete to produce
evidence to the contrary. ... [A positive test result] presumes
negligence on the part of the'person responsible.., unless the person
responsible clears himself from such presumption by proving that he
had taken all the necessary precautions. 1 5
In decisions following this and concerning the same FEI Anti-Doping
102. Wise, supra note 101, at 119.
103. Aanes, No. 2001/A/317, slip op. at 15; Leipold, No. 2000/A/312, slip op. at 13.
104. The FEI was the first international federation to include an arbitration clause in favour of
CAS in its Statutes. CAS DIGEST, supra note 2, at xxv.
105. InternationalEquestrian Fed'n, No. 91/53, supra note 80, at 87-88.
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Regulations, the CAS Panels specified that the burden of proof, which is
normally incumbent upon the person who is alleging the guilt of a third party,
is reversed. For the person responsible to have a penalty imposed upon him, it
is sufficient that the analysis performed reveals the presence of a prohibited
substance. This was considered to be a simple legal presumption and not an
irrebuttable presumption, thus a presumption, which may be overturned by
evidence to the contrary. Although the FEI regulations did not mention the
possibility of having the person responsible produce peremptory evidence,
taking into account the seriousness of the measures which may be pronounced
against the athlete in application of a general principle of law, "the person
responsible has the right to clear himself through counter-evidence (proof that
the presence of the prohibited substance is a result of an act of ill-will on the
part of a third party or that the result of the analysis is wrong)."'1 °6 Even if this
approach still might seem harsh on a morally innocent athlete, it was
considered as being necessary to ensure fairness towards all competitors and to
protect their health and well being.10 7
Concerning the admissibility of the so-called "defenses"-that is to say
arguments that may rebut the presumption of guilt-the arbitrators
subsequently acknowledged that the wording of the doping provision often did
not provide any possibility apart from showing a mistake in the identification
process. 10 8 However, the Panels found that if a federation wants to allow no
defenses at all, it had to express this in a manner that is absolutely crystal clear
and unambiguous.'1 9 In all other cases the arbitrators felt prepared to interpret
the relevant doping rules in the eyes of an athlete in order to establish to what
extent a certain degree of flexibility could be allowed. 110 Only in one case did
the Panel refuse to take into account any exculpatory evidence without further
explanation or referral to the already well-established jurisprudence. 111 In
relation to the FINA rules, the CAS found that there was also a legal
presumption that the athlete is responsible for the presence of the banned
substance and is therefore guilty. The burden of proof, which rests on FINA,
was merely to establish that a banned substance had been properly identified
in the competitor's urine. The swimmer then had the burden of disproving his
106. S. v. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 91/56 (CAS 1992), in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2,
at 93, 96; see also International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/73, supra note 81, at 157; but see
International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/63, supra note 81, at 120.
107. Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 41; see also Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur,
No. 95/141, supra note 84, at 220.
108. Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 47.
109. USA Shooting, supra note 22, at 187; Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 50.
110. Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 51.
111. Jogert, No. 97/176, slip op. at 20.
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guilt. 112 This jurisprudence was later extended to the IOC Medical Code then
in force.113
Finally, the aforementioned decision, which declared void the concept of
liability without fault, 114 established the same system of a rebuttable
presumption of guilt. In addition, the arbitrators contemplated whether even
this system was too harsh for an athlete and whether it was necessary to
consider that a positive test result could only provide prima facie evidence for
a doping offense, thus leaving the burden of proof for the culpability of the
athlete pro forma on the federation. 115 The Panel found it unnecessary to
consider the latter concept since the practical results of both concepts would
be more or less the same.
ii. The burden ofproof
The presumption is a concept of material law. Here, the burden of proof
lies with the party claiming a fact in his favor. An athlete arguing against his
presumed guilt would have to prove his innocence. The same practical result
can be achieved if, under procedural law, the burden of proof for one condition
is shifted from one party to the other. There are also CAS decisions that, with
regard to the guilt of the athlete, speak of a shift of the burden of proof rather
than of a legal presumption.
The Panels clearly considered that the burden of proof for establishing the
existence of a forbidden substance in an athlete's bodily fluids rests with the
federation. To this extent, the presumption of innocence operated in favor of
the athlete until the federation discharged that burden. 116 In one case, after
comprehensive discussion, the CAS arrived at the conclusion that the
federation had not only to prove the mere existence of a forbidden substance in
the body of the athlete, but also its ingestion. 117 This should at least be valid if
there was more than one scientific possibility as to how a certain level of a
forbidden substance might have been created. 118 The arbitrators in this case
did not demand the proof of a specific cause but rather the reasonable
exclusion of all other possible causes. 119 This reasoning remained unique. In
112. Foschi, No. 961156, slip op. at40.
113. InternationalJudo Fed'n, supra note 75, at 321.
114. Aanes, No. 2001/A/317, slip op. at 21.
115. Id.
116. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 98/208, supra note 96, 247-48; Meca-
Medina, Nos. 99/A/234 & 99/A/235, slip op. at 14.
117. International Triathlon Union, supra note 84, at 337.
118. Id. at335.
119. Id.at336-37.
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a later decision, the CAS rejected the idea that the federation had to exclude all
other possible sources of the forbidden substance. 120 Here, the arbitrators
ruled that it was up to the athlete to prove an endogenous production of a
certain substance as a valid excuse. 121
This sharing of the burden of proof has also been used in a case where the
substance found was not contained in the list of forbidden substances. The
federation claimed that this substance should be treated as a stimulant, but it
was unable to show the stimulant effects. 122 Consequently, the athlete had to
be acquitted, since no forbidden substance had been found in his urine. The
Panels recognized that it was almost impossible for a federation to offer proof
of "intent or negligence on the basis of simple objective analys[is]"-the only
piece of evidence it can produce to prove a doping offense. 123 Unlike public
prosecutors, federations do not enjoy any rights of investigation. The Panels
underlined that it was thus up to the athlete to demonstrate that he did not act
intentionally or negligently.124
iii. The standard of care
There are very few cases where an athlete was able to rebut the
presumption of guilt or successfully provided evidence that he acted without
intent or negligence. The CAS has applied high standards for an appellant to
show that he took all the necessary precautions to avoid a contamination with
doping substances. 125 In the opinion of the CAS, an elite athlete must meet a
standard of care that is above the ordinary man on the street or even the
ordinary person practicing sport as a hobby. 126 As an example, one may look
at the opinion of the CAS concerning the duties of a horse rider:
From the moment that the person responsible knows that a treatment
with prohibited substances is being administered to his horse, he must
display all the diligence necessary.... Before the competition, he
120. Union Cycliste Internationale, No. 99/A/239, slip op. at 11.
121. Id.
122. Netzle, supra note 1, at 214; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 10, at 445-47.
123. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 91/53, supra note 80, at 88.
124. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141, supra note 84, at 221; Foschi,
No. 96/156, slip op. at 41; Aanes, No. 2001/A/317, slip op. at 20; Leipold, No. 2000/A/312, slip op. at
28.
125. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/63, supra note 81, at 122; International Equestrian
Fed'n, No. 92/7 1, supra note 81, at 142; International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/73, supra note 81, at
158.
126. O'Shannessey v. Australian Olympic Comm., No. 99/A/248, slip op. at 13 (Ct. Arb. Sport
Mar. 14, 2000).
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must also verify the state of his horse by testing to see that all the
effects of the prohibited substances which had been administered in
order to medically treat the horse have disappeared and will
consequently no longer be able to influence the competition. If such is
not the case the rider will, in other words, be obliged to refrain in
taking part in the competition. 127
In another case, where the forbidden substance came from an injection
carried out by a doctor in a hospital where the athlete received medical
treatment, the Panel observed:
In view of the high sanctions placed upon the use of prohibited
anabolic steroids, it is incumbent upon the athlete, not only in his own
interests, but first and foremost in the interests of fair play in the sport
of cycling, that he actively inquire with the physician administering
the injection as to its content. In this regard, every athlete should have
closely at hand a copy of the most current and governing List of the
Categories of Doping Substances and Methods which he can place
readily at the disposal of any physician whom he consults for advice
and treatment. 128
Even where the appellants provided a witness who testified to have
contaminated the food of the athletes, the Panel did not accept this witness
because the testimony showed certain inconsistencies. In addition, the
explanations of the appellants did not seem to be very plausible either.12 9
The CAS has constantly rejected the argument of athletes that they acted
in good faith and had no interest in taking forbidden substances. In relation to
clean records and good behavior in the past, the Panel in one case observed
that this could not lead to a discharge of the burden of proof, since those who
use prohibited substances are, by definition, risk takers. 130 To admit these
(normally unsubstantiated) allegations would render the fight against doping
impossible, especially in cases where they are irrelevant in light of the other
evidence and regulations in force. 131 The Panel also held that oral testimony
127. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/71, supra note 81, at 142.
128. Union Cycliste Internationale v. Nielsen, No. 98/181, slip op. at 17 (Ct. Arb. Sport Nov. 26,
1998).
129. P. v. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 97/180, slip op. at 21 (Ct. Arb.
Sport Jan. 14, 1999).
130. Meca-Medina, Nos. 99/A/234 & 99/A/235, slip op. at 29; Arbitration CAS ad hoc Division
(O.G. Sydney 2000), 006, Baumann v. International Olympic Comm., award of 22 September, 2000,
in CAS AWARDs-SYDNEY 2000 65, 70 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2000).
131. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/86, supra note 80, at 164; Int'l Tennis Fed'n v. K.,
No. 98/223 (CAS 1999), in CAS DIGEST II, supra note 3, at 345, 358-59.
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as to innocence, however impressively given, could not outweigh scientific
evidence as to guilt. 132  Furthermore, the arbitrators have rejected the
argument that after the athlete tested positive no forbidden substances had
been found in the food and vitamins taken by the athlete. The Panel observed
that it was in the discretion of the athlete which products he would tender to be
examined. 133
The CAS has also ruled that athletes are presumed to have knowledge of
information, which is in the public domain. 134 In this case, the athlete should
have been warned by press releases issued by the IOC about the possible
contamination of nutritional supplements. Since he failed to show that he had
tested the nutritional supplement in question, he was unable to rebut the
presumption of negligence on his part.
Finally, the Panel has also rejected the allegation that the forbidden
substance was contained in meat which had been eaten prior to the
competition. 135 Without any further evidence this possibility was considered
as pure speculation. In another case where the appellants tried to produce
evidence that they had eaten contaminated meat, the Panel was not convinced
that even if they did so, the consumption could lead to the level of nandrolone
metabolites found in the urine of the athletes. 136
3. The standard of proof
The CAS Panels have also often addressed the standard of proof that has
to be applied. This question was raised mainly with respect to the rebuttal of
the presumption of guilt. As a first step the Panels have always stated that the
federation has to offer full proof of the existence of a forbidden substance in
the urine or the blood of the accused athlete. To this extent the federation has
to show "beyond all reasonable doubt and to the satisfaction of law" that there
was a case of administration of a forbidden substance. 137 The Panel in another
case confirmed that the standard of proof that had to be met by the federation
establishing a doping offense was high in that is was:
less than criminal standard, but more than the ordinary civil standard.
The Panel are [sic] content to adopt the test set out in Korneev...
132. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 98/208 supra note 96, at 251-52;
Meca-Medina, Nos. 99/A/234 & 99/A/235, slip op. at 29; Baumann, supra note 130, at 70.
133. Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 57.
134. Aanes, No. 2001/A/317, slip op. at 23.
135. Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 57.
136. Meca-Medina, Nos. 99/A/234 & 99/A/235, slip op. at 27.
137. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 91/156, supra note 44, at 18.
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[that] "ingredients must be established to the comfortable satisfaction
of the Court having in mind the seriousness of the allegation which is
made." To adopt a criminal standard (at any rate where the
disciplinary charge is not of one of a criminal offence) is to confuse
the public law of the state with the private law of an association .... 138
Additionally, the Panel rejected the appellants' claim that the sporting
regulator is still obliged to eliminate all other possibilities. 139 In a later
decision the Panel held:
The situation in "quasi-penal" procedures, such as doping in sport,
should, on the other hand, be looked at differently, among other
reasons also due to the principle "in dubio pro reo", i.e. the benefit of
doubt, which itself is an emanation of one of the most important legal
presumptions, the presumption of innocence, deeply enshrined in the
general principles of law and justice. This principle has the effect that
in criminal and similar proceedings, the two parties do not bear equal
burden of proof: while the accusing party must prove the alleged facts
with certainty, it is sufficient for the accused to establish reasons for
doubt.140
This decision remained unique. The Swiss Federal Tribunal had already
ruled that Anti-Doping sanctions were of a civil and not of a criminal law
nature. Thus, the Panels should not apply standards of criminal law. The
court affirmed that:
the duty of proof and assessment of evidence [are] problems which
cannot be regulated, in private law cases, on the basis of concepts
specific to criminal law such as the presumption of innocence, the
principle in dublo pro reo and the corresponding safeguards in the
[European Convention of Human Rights]. 14 1
In relation to the second step, the reversal of the burden of proof in respect
of the mens rea (intent or negligence), the Panel in one case of this kind left
138. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 98/208, supra note 96, at 247 (citing
Komeev & Gouliev v. International Olympic Comm., CAS Arb. Ad hoe Division O.G. Atlanta
(1998)); Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 98/211, supra note 33, at 271; Meca-
Medina, Nos. 99/A/234 & 99/A/235, slip op. at 14;Aanes, No. 2001/A/317, slip op. at 27.
139. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 98/208, supra note 96, at 246;
Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 98/211, supra note 33, at 273.
140. International Triathlon Union, supra note 84, at 341.
141. Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, BGE 119 II 271 (Switz. 1993); see also Schweizerisches
Bundesgericht, 1999 BGE 5P.83 (Switz. Mar. 31, 1999). The CAS later explicitly rejected the idea
that it had to apply criminal standard in reviewing the decisions. Aanes, No. 2001/A/317, slip op. at
18; Leipold, No. 2000/A/312, slip op. at 27.
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the question undecided as to "[w]hether the burden of proof which lies upon
the competitor can be discharged on the balance of probabilities or on the
same standard of proof as lies with the regulatory body initially .... ,,142 In an
earlier decision the CAS had expressed the view that it was not sufficient for
the athlete to provide evidence that her trainer had given her the forbidden
substance without her knowledge (in this case this witness statement also had
been modified on several occasions). 143 The Panel argued that it was "vital
that such athlete provide counter-evidence which allows it to be established
with near certainty that he has not committed a fault. In this respect, simple
inferences.., could not be sufficient."' 144 Finally one Panel explained that
under the FINA Code an athlete needs to meet:
in our view a less stringent standard than the ordinary common law
criminal standard of "beyond all reasonable doubts" but a more
stringent one than the ordinary common law civil standard "on the
balance of probability." The perceptible purpose is to prevent a
competitor from simply (and sufficiently) asserting ignorance of how
such substance got into his/her body. 145
On the other hand, the CAS considered it to be sufficient if an accused
athlete was able to cast doubt on the reliability of the test result by showing the
abstract possibility of a manipulation of the urine samples. In the case at hand
the bottles with urine could have been opened without detection. The
arbitrators observed that "doubt exists or[,] which must be to the benefit of the
appellant."' 146 In this regard it has to be observed that this "defense" is, in fact,
raised against the reliability of a piece of evidence and does not prove that
there was no fault on the side of the athlete. 147 The arbitrators also held that if
they were confronted with a purely theoretical and highly improbable
hypothesis, the least of the requirements they might ask for were in relation to
the production of circumstantial evidence, which would constitute an
indication of such a theory. 148 Consequently, the Panels did not accept an
allegation of sabotage if the athlete was unable to provide evidence to this
142. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 98/208, supra note 96, at 249.
143. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141, supra note 84, at 223.
144. Id.
145. Meca-Medina, Nos. 99/A/234 & 99/A/235, slip op. at 16; see also Meca-Medina v.
Federation Internationale de Natation, No. 2000/A/270 (Ct. Arb. Sport May 23, 2001).
146. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 91/56, supra note 106, at 97.
147. However, even a very recent decision established that the athlete may rebut the presumption
of a doping offense (not the presumption of guilt) by showing that the laboratory result was flawed
due to procedural defects. Leipold, No. 2000/A/312, slip op. at 28.
148. S. v. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/74 (CAS 1993), in CAS COMPILATION 1993 60
(1993).
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extent.149 The arbitrators seemed to demand a hypothesis that would point the
finger at some other (concrete) person, whether identified or not.150 In a later
case the arbitrators rejected testimony in which the witness declared to have
spiked a cake which was eaten by the athlete. The Panel considered that the
circumstances of this testimony and certain inconsistencies in it considerably
diminished its value.151
C. Sanctions
In the area of the sanctions, the Panels have shown a great deal of
flexibility. The Panels assume the same powers as the competent organ of the
respective federation. 152 Relying mostly on the principle of proportionality,'
153
the arbitrators have tried to adapt the length of each suspension to the
particularities of each case, taking into account the circumstances of the
doping offense as well as the personality and behavior of the athlete. Within
the framework of the federation's rules the CAS has distinguished two
different types of sanctions that could be imposed in the case of a doping
offense: a disqualification and an additional sanction, which in most cases
involves a suspension from the participation in certain competitions.
1. Disqualification
In relation to a positive sample in connection with a competition, the
Panels have constantly considered the disqualification of the athlete as being
mandatory in view of the other athletes. 154 The CAS has denied the
possibility of taking into account the special circumstances of the case or any
consideration of proportionality. One case involved a disqualification of a
basketball team because one of the players tested positive. The applicable
rules were considered to be clear and unequivocal. 155 Consequently, the
Panel, although recognizing that even the federation did not apply its rules
consistently, applied a close textual analysis. The arbitrators held that it was
for the governing body only to determine whether it would follow a flexible
149. Fosehi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 57.
150. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 98/211, supra note 33, at 266.
151. Federation Internationale de NatationAmateur, No. 97/180, slip op. at 23.
152. Aanes, 2001/A/317, slip op. at 24.
153. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141, supra note 84, at 223; Aanes,
2001/A/317, slip op. at 24.
154. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141, supra note 84, at 220; Leipold,
2000/A/312, slip op. at 28.
155. Nat' Wheelchair, supra note 21, at 184.
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approach regarding the disqualification of a team. Since the system of
penalties "did not reach a level where it must be characterised as unfair or
unreasonable[,]" the CAS could neither annul nor disregard the clear wording
of the rules in force. 156
On the other hand, the arbitrators lifted a disqualification, which was
based on the results of an out-of-competition test prior to the competition. 157
The arbitrators observed that the Anti-Doping Code providing for
disqualification was only applicable for tests carried out in relation to a
competition. Since the additional suspension following the positive test result
started only after the competition, there was no legal basis for the
disqualification. 158 The arbitrators in this case realized that it might be
shocking that an athlete who tested positive a few days prior to a competition
could keep his medals. 159 But they underlined that it would be arbitrary to
deduce from the test result prior the competition to an advantage for the
athlete during the competition itself.
In another case the Panel had special regard to the circumstances in which
the competition was carried out. The case involved a motorbike rider who
tested positive.160 The Panel observed that a racing day consisted of two
independent races where the results were counted independently. 161 Since the
athlete tested positive only after the second race, the arbitrators were not
prepared to disqualify him also from the first race. 162 Since it was possible
that the athlete had applied the forbidden substance between the two races, the
Panel held that a doping offense could not be established with respect to the
first race. 163
2. Additional sanctions
If the rules also provide for additional sanctions, these sanctions are
generally considered as being mandatory. However, the Panels have applied a
flexible approach as to the amount of the sanction. In fixing the amount of the
additional sanction, the CAS Panels have always taken the subjective elements
of the case into consideration. In an advisory opinion the CAS stated that the
156. Id. at 185.
157. B. v. International Judo Fed'n, No. 99/A/230 (CAS 1999), in CAS DIGEST II, supra note 3,
at 369, 375.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 374-75.
160. Federation Internationale de Motocyclisme, supra note 68, at 411.
161. Id.
162. Id. at421.
163. Id.
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Council of Europe Convention against Doping, as well as the International
Olympic Charter against Doping in Sport, allowed the Panel to take into
account all the special circumstances of each case in order to adapt the
sanction. 164 However, it was mostly for the athlete to show why the maximum
sanction should not be imposed. 165
There are only a few other awards where the arbitrators felt themselves
bound by the strict rules that did not allow for a devaluation. 166 In one case
the arbitrator showed a certain hesitation as to whether he was a competent
substitute for the federation's appreciation of the facts with his own.167 In
addition, the arbitrator expressed his view that the federation might have been
in a better position to impose an appropriate sanction in the light of the given
circumstances. Due to this the CAS could intervene in a sanction "only if the
rules adopted... are contrary to the general principles of law, if their
application is arbitrary, or if the sanction provided by the rules can be deemed
excessive or unfair on their face." 168
This decision disregarded the competencies of CAS Panels. Due to
Article 57 of the Code they are empowered to hear each case de novo and thus
enjoy the same powers as the federation. 169 Thus, in the event that a
suspension appears disproportionately severe, the Panel has a general
discretion to reduce this sanction. 170 Even a four-year suspension for a first
doping offense where the concentration of the forbidden substance was only
slightly above the cut-off level was at first not considered as being
disproportionate. 171 However, this decision was subsequently changed to a
two-year ban by the application of proportionality considerations. 172
On various further occasions the Panels have stressed that a flexible
system of disciplinary sanctions in doping cases should be preferred, in order
to appreciate the circumstance of each doping case. 173 Even in cases where
164. Federation Francaise de Triathlon, supra note 69, at 471.
165. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 98/208, supra note 96, at 253.
166. Id.; Meca-Medina, Nos. 99/A/234 & 99/A/235, slip op. at 20; S. v. Federation Intemationale
de Natation Amateur, No. 2000/A/274, slip op. at 37 (Ct. Arb. Sport Oct. 19,2000).
167. Dionne v. United States Bobsled & Skeleton Fed'n, No. 98/189, slip op. at 5 (Ct. Arb. Sport
Feb. 10, 1998).
168. Federazione Italiana Nuoto v. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 96/157
(CAS 1997), in CAS DIGEST, supra note 2, at 351, 358-59 (discussing disciplinary sanctions for
unfair behavior).
169. CODE, supra note 5, at art. R57.
170. Leipold, No. 2000/A/312, slip op. at 13.
171. Meca-Medina, Nos. 99/A/234 & 99/A/235, slip op. at 30.
172. Meca-Medina, No. 2000/A/270, slip op. at 27.
173. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141, supra note 84, at 223.
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the Code reflected a system of fixed penalties the CAS Panels have tried to
introduce a certain amount of flexibility. 174 In one case the Panel found that
the federation itself did not strictly apply its system of fixed sanctions. 175
Thus, the arbitrators felt empowered to introduce this flexibility in their
appreciation of the facts:
It is the Panel opinion that, if... a lower degree of guilt or no fault at
all can be proved by the athlete, sports federations may (for legal
reasons) have to introduce some flexibility in their sanctions taking
into consideration the offender's level of guilt. Although this may be
burdensome for the federation it may be necessary in order to treat the
athletes involved justly.176
Finally, the Panel in one later case stressed that it was not disputed that the
CAS had the power to vary the sanctions in doping cases.177 Thus, the general
principle that a penalty must not be disproportionate to the fault or guilt of the
accused must also be observed in all doping cases, more or less without having
regard to the statutes that may provide only fixed terms. 178 Thus, in most of
the cases the Panels are willing to consider the circumstances and the known
facts of the case in determining the amount of the sanction. 179 The conduct
and the behavior of the athlete prior to the positive test will always play an
important role.180 Also, the fact that the substance found in the body of the
athlete did not have a performance enhancing effect is taken into
consideration. 181
In a very early decision the arbitrators took into account that an athlete
administered a traditional medication that did not mention the fact that it
contained a prohibited substance. 182 Furthermore, there was the admission by
174. Fosehi, 96/156, slip op. at 48.
175. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141, supra note 84, at 223.
176. Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. 49.
177. V. v. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 96/150 (CAS 1996), in CAS
DIGEST, supra note 2, at 265, 273.
178. Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 48. "The issue of proportionality of the penalty could
therefore only arise, from the restricted standpoint of incompatibility with public policy, if the
arbitration award were to constitute an attack on personal rights which was extremely serious and
totally disproportionate to the behaviour penalized." Meca-Medina, Nos. 99/A/234 & 99/A/235, slip
op. at 30 (quoting an unreported decision of the Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, BGE 5P.83 (Switz.
Mar. 31, 1999).
179. Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 58; Meca-Medina, No. 2000/A/270, slip op. at 27.
180. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 95/141, supra note 84, at 223;
Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 96/149, supra note 35, at 260; Foschi, No.
96/156, slip op. at 61.
181. Foschi, No. 96/156, slip op. at 62.
182. International Equestrian Fed'n, No. 92/73, supra note 81, at 159.
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the athlete of the administration of the substance during the hearing, which
acted in his favor.183 In one case the Panel established a doping offense but
lifted the sanction completely in view of the special circumstances of the
case. 184 In some cases the Panels have also felt prepared to grant a probation
where the rules provided for probation. The CAS observed that it should not
interfere with the authority of the sports governing bodies as to the conditions
of such a probation. 185 Thus, the CAS must respect that a probation could
only be given for a maximum of half of the sanction imposed. 186 However, in
an earlier case the arbitrators used their power under the UCI rules to grant a
probation using their own discretion. 187 Even if the rules did not expressly
provide for a suspension on probation, the adaptation of the sanction to the
circumstances of each case may sometimes allow the imposition of such a
probation. 188
CONCLUSION
The foregoing study has shown that the CAS forms an integral part of the
world-wide fight against doping. It can provide effective protection for the
rights of the accused athlete and is able to ensure that the fight against doping
will be upheld unremittingly. During recent years the CAS has developed
quite an impressive body of decisions in this area dealing with all kinds of
problems. The CAS offers a unique possibility of international decision
making. Its jurisdiction in doping cases overcomes the traditional
multiplication of legal disputes before the state courts of various jurisdictions.
This ensures a certain degree of legal security for both the federation and the
athlete concerned.
However, there is still room for improvement. As shown, sometimes one
can identify a certain degree of misunderstanding of the legal concepts. This
uncertainty is resolved sporadically by some decisions, which will hopefully
be followed in the future. These differences are, on the one hand, due to the
fact that the arbitrators are limited to the interpretation of existing rules. Here,
the call for harmonic criteria touches the legal borders of the CAS jurisdiction.
183. Id.
184. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur, No. 96/149, supra note 35, at 260 (where
the athlete did not mention a medication, which was allowed under the rules in force, on the doping
control form).
185. Union Cycliste lnternationale, No. 2000/A/289, supra note 36, at 428-29.
186. Id.
187. Union Cycliste Internationale v. M., No. 98/212 (CAS 1999), in CAS DIGEST II, supra note
3, at 274, 282.
188. Federation Francaise de Triathlon, supra note 69, at 475.
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On the other hand, one should clearly consider that the different legal cultures
of the arbitrators may also cause certain differences as to the understanding of
the legal concepts. The clash between legal cultures is one of the features of
international arbitration and helps to ensure a certain degree of flexibility in its
decisions.
For these reasons one should be careful with harsh dogmatic criticism
from a purely academic standpoint. However, the ongoing interpretation of
doping definitions which contain only a strict liability rule has been rightly
criticized with respect to the rights of the accused athlete. Under Swiss law 189
the legal literature is unanimous in that a strict liability rule would be contrary
to Articles 20 and 27 of the Swiss Civil Code. Jurisprudence of the Swiss
state courts is still lacking and unlikely to arise. Swiss tribunals will only
control decisions of the CAS as to whether they violate the international ordre
public. This standard of review does not allow for detailed control of whether
the standards of the Swiss Civil Code are followed. That is why the CAS
itself may draw a clear line.
The rebuttable presumption of guilt is a legal solution that ensures the
respect of the rights of the athlete without making an efficient fight against
doping impossible. This concept has, in fact, been followed by most of the
Panels in the past too. Recent decisions of the CAS 190 show that the
arbitrators are also finally taking the criticism of academics into account.
Although the arbitrators in two of the three cases claim to follow a strict
liability approach, they are in fact arguing with the terms of the presumption
of guilt. According to these three decision the federation has to establish the
presence of a prohibited substance in the body of an athlete or, in other words,
the objective elements of the doping offense. 191 It is then for the athlete to
establish that the presence of such a substance was not due to any intentional
or negligent act on his part. 192 Where the athlete fails, the Panel enjoys the
discretion to adjust the sanction to a just and equitable level. 193 The near
future will show whether the work of the CAS will follow this pragmatic
approach.
189. Swiss law is applicable in most of the cases because the federation has its seat in
Switzerland. CODE, supra note 5, at art. R.58.
190. Aanes, No. 2001/A/317; L. v. Federation Internationale de Luttes Associees, No.
2000/A/310 (Ct. Arb. Sport Oct. 22, 2001); Leipold, No. 2000/A/312, slip op. at 28.
191. Federation Internationale de Luttes Associees, No. 2000/A/310, slip op. at 27.
192. Leipold, No. 2000/A/312, slip op. at 13.
193. Federation Internationale de Luttes Associees, No. 2000/A/310, slip op. at 28.
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